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Discriminatory Retaliation: Title VII
Protection for the Cooperating Employee
Megan E. Mowrey*

Discriminatory retaliation represented 32.3% of all Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claims in
2007, up from 22.6% in 1997. 28.3% of those retaliation charges
specifically involved Title VII,1 an increase from 20.3% in 1997.2
As the frequency of retaliation claims filed through the EEOC
has increased, courts have devoted more time to the issue, evidenced, for example, by the Supreme Court’s recent consideration of three retaliation cases: CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,3
Gomez-Perez v. Potter,4 and Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.5 While the
decisions in CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez respectively involved the Civil Rights Act of 19916 and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act,7 Crawford addressed retaliation under Ti* Associate Professor, Clemson University, College of Business and Behavioral Science.
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
2. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (“EEOC”), CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2008, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html. (last visited Oct. 2, 2009). Compare, for example, the percentage of all retaliation charges
filed in 1997 (18,198 of a total of 80,680 charges – 22.6%) with the number of
charges in 2002 (22,768 of a total of 84,442 charges – 27%) and in 2007 (26,663 of a
total of 82,792 charges – 32.3%). Id. The percentage of charges filed specifically
for Title VII retaliation was 20.3% in 1997 (16,394 of a total of 84,442 charges),
24.6% in 2002 (20,814 of a total of 80,680 charges), and 28.3% in 2007 (23,371 of a
total of 82,792 charges). Id.
3. 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008).
4. 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008).
5. 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 633a (2006). Both the CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez cases
were remanded for further action after the Supreme Court found that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and 29 U.S.C. § 633a did encompass discriminatory retaliation, even
though neither statute specifically stated that retaliation was an illegal act. See
CBOCS, 128 S. Ct. at 1954, 1961; Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1935, 1943.
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tle VII.8 This review examines retaliation in Crawford and analyzes the case in light of employment discrimination law.
Title VII makes discriminatory employment retaliation
illegal:9
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.10

Title VII outlaws retaliation by virtue of the Act’s opposition clause (i.e., retaliation employees suffer due to their opposition to an employer’s allegedly discriminatory acts), and the
Act’s participation clause (i.e., retaliation employees suffer due
to their participation in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
involving an employer’s alleged discrimination).11
The Supreme Court announced in Crawford that a worker
who testifies in an employer’s internal investigation of discrimination engages in opposing conduct and is protected by the opposition clause.12 The Court held that when the Crawford
employer fired its worker, in retaliation for her cooperation, the
employer violated Title VII.13 Several Circuits were already in
agreement with the Supreme Court’s classification of cooperation as protected opposing conduct, even absent additional external involvement by the EEOC.14 The Court declined to
consider whether cooperation in an internal investigation is
8. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). See
Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 846-53. Other federal statutes explicitly prohibit retaliation, including, for example, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503, 42
U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006), and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676 § 15,
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
10. Id. § 2000e-3.
11. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
12. Id. at 850-51.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 258 (3d Cir. 2001); Evans v.
City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2001); Scott v. County of Ramsey, 180
F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 1999); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 257 (7th Cir.
1996). See also discussion infra Section II.
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also protected conduct under the participation clause.15 The
Sixth Circuit, which heard the initial appeal of Crawford, had
held that cooperation was not a protected act under either
clause.16
This Article argues that Title VII protects Crawford and
similarly situated workers under both the opposition clause and
the participation clause. Not only do the aims of Title VII (i.e.,
the prevention of discrimination) counsel full coverage of employees in cases like Crawford, coverage under the opposition
and participation clauses will, consistent with the Court’s decision, promote employees’ cooperation when their employers investigate discrimination allegations. Employers may effectively
internally address reported discrimination when they talk with
workers who can attest to an allegation’s authenticity. Employees who know that their cooperation cannot result in negative
employment actions, without the employer’s exposure to potential liability, will be much more likely to cooperate through
their testimony.17
The notion that coverage is provided to employees through
both the participation and opposition clauses also recognizes
the importance of employers’ internal procedures in preventing
employment discrimination. Employers have the opportunity to
prevent and address discrimination in the workplace through
their anti-discrimination policies.18 The Supreme Court has
15. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 853.
16. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 F.
App’x 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2006).
17. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 33-34, Crawford, 129 S. Ct. 846 (No.
06-1595), 2008 WL 1721898, at *33-34. The petitioner argued that:
In the absence of protection against retaliation, witnesses and victims would
be understandably reluctant to participate in an investigation into unlawful
conduct, which inturn, would undermine Title VII’s purpose to spur employers’ efforts to deter and detect unlawful discrimination in the workplace. . . .
[ ]“Surveys have shown that a common reason for failure to report harassment to management is fear of retaliation . . . [and] a significant proportion
of harassment victims are worse off after complaining.”[ ]
Id. (citing ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615:108, at
§ V(C)(1)(b) n.59 (June 18, 1999); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 9,
19-20, Crawford, 129 S. Ct. 846 (No. 06-1595), 2007 WL 4439456, at *9, *19-20).
18. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804-07 (1998). See also discussion
infra Section II.
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held that anti-discrimination policies are a key component of an
employer’s affirmative defense to employment discrimination.19
The affirmative defense was created by the Court when it allowed employers to defend against the employers’ vicarious liability triggered by its supervisors; an employer that
demonstrates the establishment of a valid anti-discrimination
policy, and that the worker failed to use it, may successfully defeat a claim for sexual harassment, establishing the importance
of internal measures designed to address discrimination.20
Cooperation in an internal investigation is, therefore, a protected act, whether a court understands investigations to be a
part of the Title VII process that generally obligates employers
to prevent discrimination, or whether a court interprets investigations to be required under the Supreme Court’s discussion of
the affirmative defense. The affirmative defense and Title VII’s
goals both place cooperation in an investigation into the category of protected acts, cognizable “under [Title VII]” as enforced
by the EEOC, as are actions taken in connection with an official
EEOC claim.21
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford can
be compared to the Court’s resolution of other Title VII cases,
such as Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company.22 These
comparisons are useful, in part, because the Court’s decisions
demonstrate what the Court holds as necessary for Title VII to
serve the public interest. In Ledbetter, the Court required employees to file a claim for discriminatory compensation the moment that a discriminatory pay practice was initiated.23 The
Ledbetter Court thus placed a premium on potential employeeplaintiffs taking official action as soon as possible, else they
would lose the right to subsequently sue for discriminatory compensation.24 Because of the difficulties that Ledbetter posed to
future employee-plaintiffs through its requirement for filing
timely claims, Congress altered the effect of the Court’s Ledbet19. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804-07.
20. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804-07.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
22. 558 U.S. 618 (2007).
23. Id. at 623.
24. Id. The statute of limitations for filing a Title VII claim is either 180 or
300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
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ter decision by enacting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009.25
In Crawford, the Court announced that the public may be
served by fostering employment relations that protect against
retaliation provoked by an employee’s opposition to discrimination.26 Title VII tries to accomplish this protection not only
through lawsuits, but with the machinery surrounding anti-discrimination policies, the use of which may avert the need to formally sue, to the extent that discrimination and retaliation are
prevented in the first place.27 The Supreme Court stated in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White:
Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who are willing to file complaints
and act as witnesses. “Plainly, effective enforcement
could thus only be expected if employees felt free to
approach officials with their grievances.” Interpreting
the anti-retaliation provision to provide broad protection from retaliation helps assure the cooperation
upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.28

The Supreme Court compromised the “broad protection
from retaliation” that its prior decisions had urged29 to the extent that the Court failed to address the employee’s claim under
the participation clause.30
Title VII must cover retaliation for a worker fired due to his
or her cooperation in an internal investigation, as decided by
Crawford, under the opposition clause. To hold otherwise
25. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). See also infra notes 229-230 and
accompanying text.
26. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S.
Ct. 846, 852 (2009).
27. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006)
(citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). See also Crawford v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 F. App’x 373, 377 (6th
Cir. 2006) (“This court has stated that the purpose of Title VII’s participation
clause ‘is to protect access to the machinery available to seek redress for civil
rights violations and to protect the operation of that machinery once it has been
engaged.’” (quoting Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304,
1313 (6th Cir. 1989))).
28. White, 548 U.S. at 67 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,
361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)).
29. Id.
30. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 853.

5

\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-4\PLR403.txt

694

unknown

PACE LAW REVIEW

Seq: 6

27-OCT-09

14:49

[Vol. 29:689

would place Title VII at risk, not only because it would leave
workers unprotected, but because it would weaken the statute,
harming the efforts of thoughtful employers who try to prevent
discrimination. Coverage for an employee like Crawford should
come, however, through both the opposition clause and the participation clause. This Article begins its analysis by examining
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the Crawford case.
I. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, Tennessee in the Sixth Circuit
A. Procedure and Facts
In Crawford, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.31 The case, filed
by Vicky Crawford against the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, involved Crawford’s employer of thirty years, the Nashville Metropolitan
School District (“Metro”).32 The genesis of Crawford occurred
when several Metro employees accused Metro’s Employee Relations Director, Gene Hughes, of sexual harassment.33 The position Hughes held with Metro required that he examine
allegations of employment discrimination, and, because the
workers’ claims involved such discrimination by Hughes, Metro
eventually appointed Veronica Frazier, Assistant Director of
Human Resources, to conduct the investigation.34
Crawford became involved in Metro’s investigation when
Frazier interviewed employees who had worked with Hughes.35
Frazier spoke with Crawford in July 2002,36 and the interview
produced testimony by Crawford concerning Hughes’s sexual
harassment of Crawford and other employees.37 Crawford’s
31. Crawford, 211 F. App’x 373 (6th Cir. 2006), aff’g No. 03-0996, 2005 WL
6011557 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 6, 2005), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
32. Id. at 374. Crawford held several jobs during her thirty-year tenure with
Metro, including payroll coordinator, the position she occupied at the time of her
termination. Final Brief of Appellant at 5, Crawford, 211 F. App’x 373 (No. 055258), 2006 WL 3522669, at *5.
33. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 374.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 375.
36. Id.
37. Id. Crawford did not claim discrimination in the employees’ initial complaints against Hughes. Id. at 374-75.
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statements regarding the sexual harassment perpetrated by
Hughes included requests by Hughes to Crawford, and one of
her statements claimed,
that Hughes had asked to see her titties on numerous
occasions, that she would say, “Hey Dr. Hughes,
What’s up?” and he would grab his crotch and state
“you know what’s up,” that he would approach her
window and put his crotch up to the window and ask
to see her titties all at the same time, and that one
time, Hughes came into her office and she asked him
what she could do for him and he grabbed her head
and pulled it to his crotch.38

Metro ultimately took no action against Hughes, finding
that, while he “had engaged in inappropriate and unprofessional behavior,” his behavior was not actionable by Metro.39
Subsequent to its investigatory interview, Metro fired Crawford, however, for alleged embezzlement and drug use in November 2002.40 The Sixth Circuit’s opinion noted that Crawford
stated the charges were unfounded.41 Prior to Crawford’s termination, Metro fired two other employees immediately after their
respective interviews regarding Hughes’s conduct, and their
terminations rested on allegedly unfounded charges as well.42
38. Id. at 375 n.1 (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
39. Id. at 375.
40. Id. at 374. The Sixth Circuit noted two dates for Crawford’s termination.
The first was in November 2002. Id. The second was in January 2003. Id. at 375.
According to the Final Brief of the Appellant, filed with the Sixth Circuit in 2006,
Crawford was placed on administrative leave in November 2002, relating to unfounded charges against Crawford for embezzlement and drug use. Final Brief of
Appellant, supra note 32, at 15, 2006 WL 3522669, at *15. The dates of Crawford’s
administrative leave and termination were corroborated by the Final Brief of the
Appellee to the Sixth Circuit, as Metro placed Crawford on administrative leave in
November 2002 and formally fired her in January 2003. Final Brief of Defendant/
Appellee at 4, Crawford, 211 F. App’x 373 (No. 05-5258), 2006 WL 3522670, at *4.
41. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 375.
42. Id.
Despite statements from three different women describing sexual harassment by Hughes, the investigators explained that they were unwilling to
make any findings about Hughes’ actions because each of the victims was
alone with Hughes at the time of the alleged harassment. Hughes’ denial of
each allegation of harassment was apparently enough by itself to preclude
any finding of harassment.
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 6, 2008 WL 1721898, at *6.
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In the course of their interviews, each of the three fired employees confirmed that Hughes engaged in sexual harassment.43
Crawford filed a civil action against Metro in June 2003
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,44 claiming that
Metro retaliated against her by both manufacturing charges
and by firing her in response to her statements regarding
Hughes.45 The district court dismissed the case in an unpublished opinion,46 and Crawford appealed to the Sixth Circuit.47
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Discussion
The Sixth Circuit divided Title VII retaliation claims into
two types, consistent with the statute’s language and the Supreme Court’s prior experiences with the term.48 The first type
consists of retaliation that results from an employee’s opposition to an employer’s discriminatory conduct—the Act’s opposition clause.49 The second type consists of retaliation that occurs
as a result of an employee’s participation in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing regarding discriminatory conduct—the
Act’s participation clause.50
43. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 375.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
45. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 374-75. Title VII includes as an unlawful employment practice:
Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings[.]
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
46. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville/Davidson County, No. 03-0996, 2005
WL 6011557 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 6, 2005).
47. See, e.g., Final Brief of Appellant, supra note 32, at 1, 2006 WL 3522669,
at *1.
48. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 375-76. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006) (“Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision forbids
employer actions that ‘discriminate against’ an employee (or job applicant) because
he has ‘opposed’ a practice that Title VII forbids or has ‘made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII ‘investigation, proceeding, or hearing.’”)
(some internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
49. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376.
50. Id. See Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, L.P., 107 F. App’x 607, 610
(6th Cir. 2004); Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2003);
EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000). Similar
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According to the Sixth Circuit, a claim based upon the opposition clause required “active, consistent opposing activities
to warrant protection against retaliation.”51 Because Crawford
did not initiate the actions against Hughes, nor did she actively
oppose the discrimination practiced by Hughes against other
employees, Crawford’s cooperation in her employer’s internal
investigation failed to qualify as opposing conduct.52 The Sixth
Circuit stated that Crawford only cooperated “by appearing for
questioning at the request of [Metro]. . . . This is not the kind of
overt opposition that we have held is required for protection
under Title VII.”53 The Sixth Circuit explained what could be
considered opposing behavior under Title VII.54 The court
stated that opposing conduct included “complaining to anyone
(management, unions, other employees, or newspapers) about allegedly unlawful practices; refusing to obey an order because
the worker thinks it is unlawful under Title VII; and opposing
unlawful acts by persons other than the employer—e.g., former
employers, union, and co-workers.”55 The Sixth Circuit ruled
that Title VII failed to provide Crawford protection under the
opposition clause primarily because Crawford failed to claim
discrimination prior to her interview.56 Crawford’s actions, the
to Title VII, which prohibits retaliation under the participation and opposition
clauses, the Americans with Disabilities Act also establishes participation clause
and opposition clause claims. “No person shall discriminate against any individual
because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this
chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006). Protection is given under the Fair Labor
Standards Act as well, where it is unlawful for any person:
[T]o discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or
is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve
on an industry committee.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
51. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Bell, 107 F. App’x at 610; Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215
F.3d 561, 579 (6th Cir. 2000)).
55. Id. (quoting Johnson, 215 F.3d at 579) (internal quotation marks omitted
and emphasis added).
56. Id.

9
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court reasoned, were passive conduct, not active opposition, as
required by the court’s interpretation of the statute.57
The Sixth Circuit also held that Crawford’s cooperation
failed to constitute a recognizable claim under the participation
clause of Title VII.58 According to the court, claims for violations under the participation clause must come in tandem with
involvement by the EEOC.59 Because the investigation into
Hughes’s discrimination stemmed from Metro’s own, internal
actions, and because it was not due to the EEOC’s intervention,
Metro’s internal investigation failed to trigger protection for
Crawford under Title VII.60 The Sixth Circuit stated, “Title VII
protects an employee’s participation in an employer’s internal
investigation into allegations of unlawful discrimination where
that investigation occurs pursuant to a pending EEOC
charge.”61 The Sixth Circuit pointed to prior decisions in its
own circuit, as well as decisions by the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, and the District Court of Tennessee, stating:
“[T]he participation clause does not protect an employee’s participation in an employer’s internal, in-house investigation, conducted apart from a formal charge with the EEOC; at
minimum, an employee must have filed a charge with the
EEOC or otherwise instigated proceedings under Title VII.”62
The Sixth Circuit held, therefore, that the mechanisms of Title
VII do not include internal investigations, without the benefit of
the government’s intercession, as a necessary part of Title VII’s
purpose of preventing discrimination under the participation
clause.63

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2003)).
62. Id. (quoting Abbott, 348 F.3d at 543; Brower v. Runyon, 178 F.3d 1002,
1006 (8th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Total Sys. Serv., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 n.2 (11th
Cir. 2000); Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990); Goldberg v.
Media Gen., Inc., No. 01-325, 2003 WL 21920923, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. June 18, 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id.
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C. The Holding of the Sixth Circuit
1. The Circuit Court’s Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit concluded its decision in Crawford by
stating that:
[T]he purpose of Title VII’s participation clause “is to
protect access to the machinery available to seek redress for civil rights violations and to protect the operation of that machinery once it has been engaged.
Accordingly, any activity by the employee prior to the
instigation of statutory proceedings is to be considered
pursuant to the opposition clause.”64

The court explained that Crawford’s claim could not rest
with the opposition clause, nor could it be raised under the participation clause.65 The court stated that its interpretation
served to encourage internal investigations.66 In the court’s
words, “the participation clause prevents the burden of Title VII
from falling on an employer who proactively chooses to launch
an internal investigation. Expanding the purview of the participation clause to cover such investigations would simultaneously discourage them.”67 The court’s reasoning presumed that
if all employees who are called to testify in an internal investigation merit Title VII protection by virtue of a retaliation claim,
employers will not initiate internal investigations, fearing that
any employee called to testify may subsequently file suit.68 The
Sixth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
suit.69
2. Analysis
Despite the Supreme Court’s prior admonitions that employers must try to prevent discrimination,70 the Sixth Circuit
64. Id. at 377 (quoting Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d
1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989)).
65. Id. at 376.
66. Id. at 377.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 66-67 (2006)
(discussing employees’ cooperation in an investigation of discrimination as necessary to the application and enforcement of Title VII).
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did not look at the Crawford employee’s circumstance as an opportunity to protect workers through a successful application of
Title VII. Instead, the Sixth Circuit assumed that protecting
the worker in Crawford posed a potential danger to employers;
by protecting the Crawford employee, employers would stop investigating discrimination out of fear of retaliation lawsuits,
particularly if cooperation in an investigation constituted protected conduct.71
The court’s assessment failed to recognize that an employer’s disinclination to investigate would compromise the
ability of the employer to establish an affirmative defense to
discrimination charges should the alleged discrimination take
the form of an intangible employment action against the employee.72 The Supreme Court created the affirmative defense
when it held that a worker’s claim, that his or her employer is
vicariously liable for an intangible harm caused by a discriminating supervisor, will be unsuccessful to the extent that the
employer established a valid anti-discrimination policy and that
the employee failed to use it.73 A valid policy will likely provide
for investigations into a worker’s discrimination allegations.74
A failure to investigate, therefore, would eliminate the employer’s access to the defense because the employer would be
unable to establish its first element. The Sixth Circuit believed
that the employer needs protection from the “burden of Title
VII,”75 not that the employee needs protection through Title VII
when the employer decides to fire the worker who cooperates.
71. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376. As discussed infra, the Supreme Court
would come to a different conclusion. See discussion infra Section III (analyzing
the Court’s reversal of the Sixth Circuit’s decision, its holding that Crawford had
established retaliation under the opposition clause, and explaining that the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning was flawed because the lower court incorrectly assumed that
classifying cooperation in internal investigations as protected conduct would inevitably lead employers to stop investigating).
72. See discussion infra Section III.
73. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-07 (1998).
74. See discussion infra Section II.
75. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 377. The “burden” here refers to the obligation
of preventing discrimination and the likelihood of liability should the employer’s
efforts fail. See generally Lena P. Ryan, Expanding the Scope of the Expansive
Approach: The Burlington Northern Standard as a Per Se Approach to Federal
Anti-Retaliation Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 745 (2007) (discussing the burden of the
employer to prevent discrimination under Title VII and other federal laws).
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II. An Employee’s Claims under the Opposition Clause and
the Participation Clause
This section more specifically examines the Sixth Circuit’s
refusal to hold that Crawford established a cause of action
under either the opposition clause or the participation clause of
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. Indeed, the holdings of
other Circuits, prior Supreme Court rulings involving Title VII,
and the practical implications of the Sixth Circuit’s decision
counsel otherwise.
A. The Opposition Clause: Is Cooperating Opposing?
Crawford argued that Title VII afforded her protection
through the opposition clause of Title VII.76 Rather than addressing the several circuits that had already held that cooperation in internal investigations constitutes opposing conduct for
purposes of the opposition clause,77 the Sixth Circuit held that
Crawford’s cooperation was a passive action and unsuitable for
protection.78 The court stated that “[t]his is not the kind of
overt opposition that we have held is required for protection
under Title VII.”79 The Sixth Circuit believed that cooperation
under the facts in Crawford was activity warranting no protection against retaliation.80 Other circuit courts disagree. The
following section examines allegations in circumstances similar
to Crawford’s case from the Third, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth
Circuits. Only one of the cases was referenced, albeit not discussed, by the Supreme Court in its Crawford decision.81
1. Cardenas v. Massey
Gerard Cardenas brought several charges against his state
employer and state officials, alleging discrimination based on
76. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 375-76. See also B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83
TUL. L. REV. 439, 477 (2008) (examining Crawford’s opposition clause claim).
77. See Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2001); Evans v.
City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2001); Scott v. County of Ramsey, 180
F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 1999); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 257 (7th Cir.
1996). See also discussion infra Section II.A.
78. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 375-76.
79. Id. at 376.
80. Id.
81. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S.
Ct. 846, 850, 851 (2009) (citing McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 262).
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his ethnicity, including disparate pay, a hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of federal and state anti-discrimination laws.82 As summarized by the Third Circuit,
“[e]ssentially, the claims [concerned Cardenas’s] . . . contention
that he was hired at a lower grade level than merited by the
work he was assigned, received disparate pay as a result, was
not promoted as merited, was the subject of retaliation, and was
subject to a hostile work environment, all as a result of his
ethnicity.”83 The district court granted summary judgment on
some of the claims, Cardenas settled another with one of the
defendants, and he subsequently appealed to the Third Circuit
on the remaining claims.84 While the Circuit Court addressed
Cardenas’s claims of disparate pay and a hostile work environment, both of which the court remanded,85 an issue on appeal
also concerned whether Cardenas had established retaliation in
violation of federal and state laws, including Title VII.86
Cardenas supported his allegations by claiming that he suffered retaliation after providing support to two of his co-workers
when they filed complaints against supervisors.87 In addition to
supporting his co-workers, Cardenas also filed his own report of
discrimination against Massey and Rebo with the employer’s
Equal Employment Opportunity Officer.88 Cardenas’s actions
in support of his co-workers occurred as a result of his employer’s internal investigation, and, until Cardenas filed his
own EEOC charge, no external actions had been filed.89 As a
result of the support Cardenas gave to his co-workers and Cardenas’s own allegations, Cardenas claimed that his employer
took retaliatory actions against him, including:
[F]or example, an allegedly undeservedly low performance evaluation . . . , a threat of discipline which sent
him to the hospital with stress-induced chest pains, in82. Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 253-54 (claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
2000e-3 (2006), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 10:5-1 (West 2002)).
83. Id. at 254.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 269.
86. Id. at 260, 263.
87. Id. at 260.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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creased personnel disruptions in his unit, and an unusual summons to the human resources department
which provoked a second stress attack severe enough
to warrant a second hospital visit.90

Cardenas resigned, claiming that he suffered a constructive discharge (i.e., a “hostile environment . . . severe enough to have
precipitated Cardenas’ resignation”), and he sued pursuant to
an EEOC action.91
The district court listed the elements of a prima facie retaliation claim,92 which the Third Circuit repeated: “(1) that [Cardenas] engaged in a protected activity; (2) that [Cardenas]
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there was
a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”93 The district court dismissed Cardenas’s retaliation complaint based on its judgment that the
employer’s actions were not prompted by protected activity engaged in by Cardenas, and that, if they had been, that Cardenas
could not show a “causal relationship between [Cardenas’s protected] activity and the actions that were allegedly
retaliatory.”94
The Third Circuit, however, held that Cardenas had engaged in protected activity by virtue of his support of co-workers
and his own complaints.95 The only additional evidence of retaliation considered by the court concerned the timing of the employer’s behavior relative to Cardenas’s actions.96 The court
stated that the temporal relationship of the low performance
evaluations, threats of discipline, and demands that Cardenas
appear at the personnel office could not constitute retaliation
merely because each followed Cardenas’s engagement in protected activity.97 While Cardenas claimed that the temporal relationship established causation,98 the Third Circuit disagreed,
90. Id.
91. Id. at 267.
92. Cardenas v. Massey, No. 96-CV-4077, 1999 WL 33496397, at *22 (D.N.J.
Mar. 31, 2000).
93. Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 263.
94. Id. (discussing the district court’s holding). See Cardenas, 1999 WL
33496397, at *22-23.
95. Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 253.
96. Id. at 264.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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stating, “[t]he temporal relationship in this case is, alone, insufficient to establish causation, because the alleged protected activity took place over a substantial period of time and any
routine employment action taken during that period would necessarily be related temporally.”99 The Third Circuit agreed with
the district court and affirmed the dismissal of the retaliation
claims.100
The retaliation claim fell, therefore, because Cardenas was
not able to establish causation, as he could not show that his
employer’s actions were a direct response to his support of his
co-workers and to his personal claims; his claim did not fall due
to a failure to establish that he had engaged in a protected activity. In the Third Circuit’s opinion, Cardenas had engaged in
protected activity in the form of both his support of co-workers
and his own allegations of discriminatory treatment, despite
the fact that at the moment Cardenas made his allegations, the
charges were part of an internal investigation.101
Crawford also testified in an internal investigation.102 The
Third Circuit would likely have characterized her conduct as
“opposing”—contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s decision.
2. Evans v. City of Houston
Lee Evans, an African American nurse employed by the
Health and Human Services Department of Houston, Texas
(the “City”), claimed that the City had engaged in racial and age
discrimination in violation of several statutes, including Title
VII,103 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),104
and State human rights statutes that prohibited discriminatory
conduct.105 In Evans’s case, she cooperated in an internal investigation of age and race discrimination allegedly committed by
99. Id. See also generally Justin P. O’Brien, Weighing Temporal Proximity in
Title VII Retaliation Claims, 43 B.C. L. REV. 741 (2002) (discussing timing and the
requirements needed to establish liability in lawsuits alleging retaliation).
100. Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 264.
101. Id. at 263.
102. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 F.
App’x 373, 374 (6th Cir. 2006).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-3(a) (2006).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006).
105. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.051, 21.055 (Vernon 2006). See Evans v. City
of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2001).
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her supervisor, Rosa Abram, against her co-worker.106 Shortly
after Evans’s testimony in an internal grievance hearing in January 1995 was postponed, the City decided to demote her.107
She was not notified of the coming demotion until nine days after actually giving her testimony.108 The Fifth Circuit noted
that the effective date of the demotion was in dispute,109 and
complicating the actions taken by the City was whether the demotion occurred while Evans was serving a probationary period.110 The City required all workers who had been promoted
to complete an automatic probationary period during their first
six months; two of the four proffered dates of Evans’s demotion
fell within her probationary period.111
Focusing on the retaliation claim, the district court acknowledged that Evans had engaged in protected activity by
testifying at the employer-held hearing, consistent with Long v.
Eastfield College.112 In Long, the Fifth Circuit provided the elements of retaliation under a Title VII claim in a summary judgment action, which included: “(1) that [the plaintiff] engaged in
activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment
action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.”113 The
106. Evans, 246 F.3d at 347.
107. Id. at 347, 353.
108. Id. at 347.
109. Id. The court noted that the City had claimed in its brief that Evans was
demoted “during a promotional probationary period which specifically directs a supervisor to ascertain whether an employee is competent to perform his or her new
duties within six (6) months.” Id. at 351 n.5.
110. Id. at 347.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 352 (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.
1996)).
113. Long, 88 F.3d at 304. See also Evans, 246 F.3d at 352. The Fifth Circuit
noted in Evans that the district court had correctly determined that a Title VII
retaliation claim should be read consistently with the Supreme Court’s holding in
McDonnell Douglas Corporation. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), which had
announced the requirements for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Evans, 246 F.3d at 348-49. These requirements
included:
(1) [T]hat she belongs to a racial minority; (2) that she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that, despite her qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) that, after her rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of the complainant’s qualifications.
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district court held that Evans failed to meet the second element
of a prima facie retaliation claim because she could not establish that her demotion was an adverse employment action.114
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that Evans
had engaged in a protected activity, and thus had satisfied the
first element of the Long criteria.115 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit held that Evans’s demotion may have constituted a tangible employment action in satisfaction of the second element.116
The court also noted that “Evans’s demotion could very well be
an adverse employment action if it meets certain criteria,”117
but it declined to analyze the issue “[b]ecause Evans raised a
fact question as to this issue, [and thus] summary judgment
was improper.”118 The court noted that if the demotion had occurred after the probationary period, it would be a tangible employment action cognizable under the statute.119
In regard to Long’s third requirement for a plaintiff to establish a retaliation claim, the Fifth Circuit held that “a plaintiff need not prove that her protected activity was the sole factor
motivating the employer’s challenged decision in order to establish the ‘causal link’ element of a prima facie case.”120 The City
argued that Evans had experienced problems in her position,
stating that she “has had a checkered disciplinary history with
the Department.”121 Despite the City’s production of legitimate
reasons for Evans’s demotion, the court determined that:
“Close timing between an employee’s protected activity and an adverse action against [her] may provide
the ‘causal connection’ required to make out a prima
Id. at 348 (citing McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802).
114. Id. at 351-52 (citing Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708
(5th Cir. 1997)).
115. Id. at 353.
116. Id. at 353-54.
117. Id. at 353 (citing Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 933 n.21 (5th
Cir. 1999)). See also O’Brien, supra note 99, at 741, 751 n.94 (discussing the temporal proximity of protected conduct and retaliatory acts).
118. Evans, 246 F.3d at 354.
119. Id. at 353-54.
120. Id. at 354 (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d at 305 n.4 (5th Cir.
1996)).
121. Id. at 351 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Evans had been suspended for misbehavior twice during this period: once in July 1995 and once in
February 1997. Id. at 347.
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facie case of retaliation.” . . . Accordingly, we find that
a time lapse of five days in this case is sufficient to
provide a “causal connection” that enables Evans to
satisfy the third prong of the prima facie case of her
retaliation claims against the City.122

The court also stated that because evidence of pretext existed for the defendant’s conduct, such evidence should have
been presented to the factfinder, and thus the district court’s
summary judgment was inappropriate.123 The district court’s
decision on the issue of retaliation was reversed by the Third
Circuit, but its decisions regarding the remaining claims were
affirmed.124
Evans suggests that testimony in an employer’s internal
procedure constitutes “opposing” conduct.125 Therefore, it is arguable that based on its language, the Fifth Circuit would have
held that Crawford’s cooperation similarly constituted protected
opposition.
3. McDonnell v. Cisneros
McDonnell involved two plaintiffs, Mary Pat McDonnell
and Thomas Bookmeier, who were accused of sexual misconduct
via an anonymous note sent to their employer, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).126 HUD’s
internal investigation failed to reveal any sexual misconduct,
but both workers protested the manner in which they had been
investigated.127 HUD failed to take any action in response to
their protests, so McDonnell took further action and complained
“that management ostracized, disdained, and ridiculed her in
retaliation for her having filed complaints.”128 At the same
122. Id. at 354 (quoting Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188
(5th Cir. 1997)). The Fifth Circuit further stated that “a time lapse of up to four
months has been found sufficient to satisfy the causal connection for summary
judgment purposes.” Id. (quoting Weeks v. NationsBank, N.A., No. 3:98-CV1352M, 2000 WL 341257, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2000)). See also generally
O’Brien, supra note 99 (discussing timing and the requirements needed to establish liability in lawsuits alleging retaliation).
123. Evans, 246 F.3d at 354-55.
124. Id. at 359.
125. Id. at 353-54.
126. McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 257 (7th Cir. 1996).
127. Id. at 258.
128. Id.
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time, HUD reassigned Bookmeier “as a punishment for his having failed to control his subordinate—that is, to get McDonnell
to drop her complaints.”129
Taking each plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claims in turn,
the Seventh Circuit first held that McDonnell’s treatment by
HUD failed to constitute retaliation, stating that:
The allegedly retaliatory conduct was merely the continuation of the conduct giving rise to the complaints. . . . [N]othing changed when [McDonnell] filed
her complaints. There was no ratcheting up of the
harassment. Therefore the complaints could not have
been the cause of the ostracism, disdain, and ridicule
of which she complains . . . .130

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
McDonnell’s case.131
Second, the Seventh Circuit held that Bookmeier’s claim of
retaliation, that he was reassigned when he failed to quash McDonnell’s complaints, was an illegal and retaliatory act.132 The
Circuit Court stated that “[s]everal courts, including our own,
hold that assisting another employee with his (in this case her)
discrimination claim, as well as other endeavors to obtain the
employer’s compliance with Title VII, is protected ‘opposition
conduct.’”133 Bookmeier’s punishment by HUD stemmed from
what the Seventh Circuit characterized as passive opposition;
Bookmeier failed to prevent McDonnell’s ongoing complaints.134
The punishment meted out by HUD was retaliatory, and the
Seventh Circuit remanded Bookmeier’s retaliation claim.135
The Seventh Circuit avoided making a determination that
would have protected employers in these circumstances; the
court did not allow a situation whereby employers who encourage supervisors to suppress their subordinates’ complaints
129. Id.
130. Id. at 259.
131. Id. at 263.
132. Id. at 261-62.
133. Id. at 262 (citing EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 1993);
Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Rucker
v. Higher Educ. AIDS Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1979); Novotny v. Great
Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1260-61 (3d Cir. 1978)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 262-63.
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of discrimination, through actual or threatened punishment
against the supervisors if the supervisors failed to keep their
subordinates in line, would be able to avoid the supervisors’ access to the courts though Title VII’s retaliation machinery:136
Passive resistance is a time-honored form of opposition
. . . and it would be very odd to suppose that Congress
meant a form of behavior that straddles what the
cases, characterizing the dual structure of the retaliation provision, call “opposition” and “participation”
conduct to fall between the stools. The result would be
that employers could obtain immunity from the retaliation statute by directing their subordinates to take
steps to prevent other workers (as by threat of dismissal or other discipline) from complaining about
discrimination.137

In Crawford, a similar logic holds—if Title VII does not protect the cooperating employee in the course of an internal investigation by determining it is not at least opposing conduct, then
the Act’s proscriptions fail to cover the vulnerable employee
who needs protection.
4. Scott v. County of Ramsey
The Ramsey County, Minnesota, Sheriff’s Department (the
“Department”) fired Gregory Scott, a deputy sheriff, within a
month of Scott’s having provided corroborating statements in
an internal investigation of discrimination claims made by his
co-worker, Mark Kolasa.138 New deputies in the Department
worked under a probationary term for the first twelve months
after their hire, during which time they were at-will employees.139 The Department ordered Scott to testify in the internal
investigation “[o]n the same day that he received his second
performance evaluation,” at the end of his probationary term.140
Kolasa was a probationary employee when he claimed that he
suffered discriminatory treatment by two female co-workers.141
Sergeant Biehn, the individual who supervised Scott and Ko136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 262.
Id.
Scott v. County of Ramsey, 180 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 916.
Id.
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lasa, allegedly failed to take action in response to Kolasa’s complaints.142 A few days after the distribution of the final internal
investigation report, which contained Scott’s statements, a
subordinate was ordered by a superior in the Department “to
assemble negative information regarding Scott for the purpose
of documenting his termination, despite the fact that [Scott]
had seen the favorable end-of-probation performance review.”143
Within a month, Scott was fired, and he then sued the Department for retaliation in violation of Title VII.144 The Department
defended its actions in the district court, stating that the termination was justified because Scott had abused sick leave and
was absent for training.145 Scott successfully argued that he received a positive performance review immediately preceding his
termination, and the district court found for Scott.146 The Department then appealed.147
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior holdings regarding discrimination and the burden-shifting framework used in
establishing a prima facie case,148 the Eighth Circuit noted that,
“[t]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff
must show that he engaged in a protected activity, that the defendant took adverse action against him, and that there is a
connection between the two.”149 While burden-shifting allows
the defendant and plaintiff to argue over the lawful or unlawful
reasons for the employer’s actions, “the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff to show that the termination
was motivated by intentional retaliation.”150 In Scott’s case, the
Eighth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could have concluded
that Scott presented sufficient evidence proving that the Department retaliated against him, regardless of the Department’s arguments to the contrary.151 The court held that the
conduct in which Scott participated—i.e., testifying in an inter142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Scott, 180 F.3d at 917.
Id. (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993)).
Id. at 918.
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nal discrimination investigation—constituted protected conduct
to which the opposition clause applied.152
As examined in the preceding section, circuit courts have
held that cooperation in an internal investigation constitute opposing behavior under the opposition clause—as should have
been true in Crawford’s case in the Sixth Circuit. Crawford’s
participation-clause claim will be addressed next.
B. Coverage under the Participation Clause
The Supreme Court declined to address Crawford’s claim
under the participation clause.153 Circuit courts have held that
in order for the participation clause to protect cooperation, a
prior external official act must have been taken, particularly
through the EEOC.154 Future courts may reconsider whether
Title VII includes cooperation as participating conduct, protected against retaliation by the Act, irrespective of an official
claim. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford may
indicate that complete coverage for similarly situated employees under both the opposition and the participation clauses is
warranted. The following section explores Crawford’s claim
152. Id.
153. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S.
Ct. 846, 853 (2009).
154. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County,
Tenn., 211 F. App’x 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) (“participation in an internal investigation . . . in the absence of any pending EEOC charge is not a protected activity
under the participation clause”); Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 543
(6th Cir. 2003) (“Title VII protects an employee’s participation in an employer’s
internal investigation into allegations of unlawful discrimination where that investigation occurs pursuant to a pending EEOC charge”); Brower v. Runyon, 178
F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Not all discussions with individuals who are part
of the Title VII grievance process or all informal complaints will amount to participation in a Title VII proceeding, however. At a minimum there would have to be
factual allegations of discrimination against a member of a protected group and
the beginning of a proceeding or investigation under Title VII.”); EEOC v. Total
Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000) (“at a minimum, some
employee must file a charge with the EEOC (or its designated representative) or
otherwise instigate proceedings under the statute for the conduct to come under
the participation clause”); Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990)
(“Accusations made in the context of charges before the Commission are protected
by statute; charges made outside of that context are made at the accuser’s peril.”);
Goldberg v. Media Gen., Inc., No. 01-CV-325, 2003 WL 21920923, at *11 (E.D.
Tenn. June 18, 2003) (“the instigation of proceedings leading to the filing of a complaint or a charge, including a visit to a government agency to inquire about the
filing [of] a charge, is a prerequisite to protection under the participation clause”).
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that her cooperation was protected participating conduct, as
well as that it was a protected act of opposition, by looking to
the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of the issue, and then by evaluating
the Circuit’s approach in light of the Supreme Court’s holdings.
1. Crawford and the Affirmative Defense
The Crawford employee claimed that prior EEOC charges
need not be filed in order to trigger protection under the participation clause.155 The employee argued that requiring an employee (or a co-worker) to officially file a complaint with the
EEOC contravened the creation of an affirmative defense to
sexual harassment, as announced by the Supreme Court in two
1998 cases, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (also known as “the Faragher defense”).156 The affirmative defense relieves the employer from
vicarious liability for its supervisor’s sexually harassing behavior when, “(1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2)
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”157 The affirmative defense
may be raised when sexual harassment results in an intangible
employment action suffered by the employee.158 The employee
who is, for example, fired by his or her supervisor, suffers a tangible action; tangible actions include “hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,” and
the affirmative defense is unavailable for such actions.159
Despite the premium placed by the Supreme Court on the
creation of anti-discrimination policies, and the need to ensure
155. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 13, 39, 2008 WL 1721898, at
*13, *39. See also Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376.
156. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376-77. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-07
(1998). The Supreme Court issued decisions regarding Faragher and Ellerth on
the same day in 1998, and each case concerned essentially the same issue (i.e., the
employer’s liability for a supervisor’s sexually harassing conduct and the employer’s use of the affirmative defense). In each case, the Court reached the same
holding. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07.
157. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807).
158. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
159. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
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that such policies are valid through, for example, effective investigations of alleged discrimination, the Sixth Circuit’s decision held that employees who cooperate in purely internal
investigations are unprotected by Title VII.160 Internal investigations are not, in the Sixth Circuit’s understanding, official
acts, as required by the participation clause.161 The Sixth Circuit concluded that, absent additional, external actions, employees may be fired with impunity if and when they cooperate in an
internal investigation.162
If an investigation is not provided, such inaction jeopardizes the employer’s ability to raise the affirmative defense, because the failure indicates that a valid anti-discrimination
policy was not in place.163 As the Supreme Court noted in
Faragher, “those responsible for city operations could not reasonably have thought that precautions against hostile environments in any one of many departments in far-flung locations
could be effective without communicating some formal policy
against harassment, with a sensible complaint procedure.”164
Crawford worked for a government agency, as was true for the
employee in Faragher.165 A “sensible complaint procedure”
must logically encompass a method of investigating a complaint; absent an investigation, the policy and process would
160. The participation clause provides protection against retaliation when the
employee participates in acts of discrimination made unlawful “under this subchapter.” Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
Crawford’s claim in the Sixth Circuit with regard to the participation clause fundamentally involved whether the employee’s act must come in the form of an external
official claim, in order to comport with the statute’s language. See Crawford, 211
F. App’x at 376-77.
161. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376-77.
162. Id. The affirmative defense would obviate the employer’s blame should
any intangible action be taken against the worker if the worker eventually files, as
long as a valid anti-discrimination policy is in place and the employee failed to use
it.
163. See, e.g., 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 853 (2009); 52 AM. JUR.
3D Proof of Facts 1, § 9 (2009). See also Brooke Iley & Mark Blondman, An Employer’s Guide to Conducting an Internal Investigation, CORP. COMPLIANCE & REG.
NEWSL. (Law.com, New York, N.Y.), July 21, 2006, available at http://www.law.
com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=900005458454 (discussing how employers may conduct
an investigation).
164. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808-09 (1998) (emphasis
added).
165. See id. at 781 (stating that Faragher worked for the Parks and Recreation Department of Boca Raton, Florida).
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take the form of a claim and a conclusion, devoid of any report
and analysis of the allegations.166 The Sixth Circuit took the
position that, while it may be to the employer’s advantage to
investigate, simply because the affirmative defense crafted this
incentive did not signal that an investigation qualifies as an official action.167
The Sixth Circuit’s discussion and interpretation of the affirmative defense arguably confused two concepts. First, the affirmative defense becomes critical only when a supervisor’s
sexually harassing behavior results in an intangible employment action.168 The employer can raise the affirmative defense
and avoid vicarious liability for intangible actions to the extent
that the employer had a viable anti-discrimination policy and
the employee failed to take advantage of it.169 The affirmative
defense is available when no material employment actions have
been taken against an employee; the Court has stated, “Tangible employment actions, such as a termination, pose material
harms of the first order, and the affirmative defense is not
166. Id. An effective anti-harassment policy may also allay an employer’s
concerns regarding punitive damage awards, since such awards are available in
cases of intentional discrimination; an employer may not owe punitive damages if
it can demonstrate the presence of a valid anti-discrimination policy. See Kolstad
v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999) (“giving punitive damages protection to employers who make good-faith efforts to prevent discrimination in the
workplace accomplishes Title VII’s objective of motivating employers to detect and
deter Title VII violations”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
167. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 377.
168. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64-65
(2006). There, the Court noted that:
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) . . . speaks of a
Title VII requirement that violations involve tangible employment action
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. But Ellerth does so only to identify a class of [ ]hostile work environment[ ] cases in which an employer should be held vicariously liable
(without an affirmative defense) for the acts of supervisors. Ellerth did not
discuss the scope of the general anti-discrimination provision. And Ellerth
did not mention Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision at all. At most, Ellerth
sets forth a standard that petitioner and the Solicitor General believe the
anti-retaliation provision ought to contain. But it does not compel acceptance of their view.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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available.”170 When the employer is merely investigating alleged discrimination, the employee who cooperates in an investigation may have personally suffered no intangible action, or
for that matter, a tangible action, at that moment, and the alleged discriminatory acts may, instead, involve a co-worker and
not the cooperating employee at all.171 According to the Sixth
Circuit analysis, if the cooperating employee is fired, but has
not filed an EEOC charge (and neither has a co-worker filed
such a charge), then the employer may fire that cooperating employee as a result of its internal investigation (i.e., the employee
may be fired because of his or her cooperation, despite the Supreme Court’s admonition to employers that they establish
anti-discrimination policies and that employees use them).172
Again, in the context of an investigation, there may be no intangible or tangible employment actions involving the cooperating
employee. Firing the cooperating employee, whose testimony
may be personally unconnected to the initial allegation of discrimination (because the cooperating worker has not directly
suffered discrimination against him or her and merely supports
a co-worker’s claim), certainly constitutes a tangible employment action,173 but, according to the Sixth Circuit, it is not retaliation punishable under the Act.174
170. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. See also Megan E. Mowrey, Discriminatory Pay
and Title VII: Filing a Timely Claim, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 379 & n.512
(2008) (discussing Ellerth and tangible harms).
171. Crawford’s statements to the employer show that she did personally suffer discrimination. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County,
Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009); Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 374. It is understandable in Crawford’s case that Crawford hesitated to file her own complaint, despite
the discrimination she endured; the person charged with investigating discrimination claims was the person who allegedly committed the harassment. Crawford,
211 F. App’x at 374. Justice Ginsburg raised this issue during oral argument:
[T]his is a statute that’s meant to govern the workplace with all of its realities. One of them was when they asked, well, why didn’t you make a complaint, use whatever internal remedies [sic] there are? She said, because
the person in this outfit who is charged with receiving complaints is the
harasser.
Transcript of Record at 38, Crawford, 129 S. Ct. 846 (No. 06-1595), 2008 WL
4527984, at *38 (oral argument).
172. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998).
173. See Mowrey, supra note 170, at 379 n.512.
174. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376-77.
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Second, the Circuit Court failed to adequately weigh the notion that the Supreme Court altered the parties’ approach to sex
discrimination claims with the advent of the affirmative defense; the Court virtually eliminated an employer’s potential vicarious liability through the affirmative defense in exchange for
the principle that Title VII’s protections should encourage the
prevention of discrimination through the establishment and the
use of anti-discrimination policies in the workplace.175 If the exchange is honored, cooperating employees should find that their
cooperation in an investigation of their own or a co-worker’s discrimination is protected by the Act. As noted by the Supreme
Court:
The anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace
where individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based
status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure
that primary objective by preventing an employer from
interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees. The substantive provision seeks to
prevent injury to individuals based on who they are,
i.e., their status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks
to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do,
i.e., their conduct.176

In order to accomplish Title VII’s goals, the anti-retaliation
provision should be interpreted as affording protection that encourages employees to come forward, rather than abandoning
workers when the cooperation results in an employer’s negative
response.177
Interpreting internal investigations as sufficient to trigger
protection under the participation clause also would have a
175. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-08. See also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62-64 (2006) (discussing the substantive and anti-retaliation
protections of Title VII).
176. White, 548 U.S. at 63 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 800-01 (1973)). See also George, supra note 76, at 472-76 (discussing the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense).
177. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
employees’ cooperation in Title VII actions). “Interpreting the anti-retaliation provision to provide broad protection from retaliation helps assure the cooperation
upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.” White, 548
U.S. at 67.
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practical effect; to decide otherwise puts employees’ cooperation
in jeopardy because employees would know that their cooperation may permit a resulting termination.178 A termination certainly constitutes a tangible employment action, but if
cooperation in an investigation is not adequate to trigger complete protection, termination under the circumstances of cooperation is an action against which the employee has limited
recourse under Title VII.
The Sixth Circuit also supported its analysis by stating
that if an employer fired a worker for his or her cooperation in
an internal investigation, the termination indicates that the
employer does not possess a valid anti-discrimination policy, as
required by the affirmative defense:
Certainly, a policy or practice of firing a person who
testified negatively during an investigation into complaints of sexual harassment would not be “reasonable.” Courts have held that an anti-harassment policy
designed to deter sexual harassment can help an employer meet its burden as to the first element of the
Faragher test only if the policy is “both reasonably designed and reasonably effectual” and not administered
“in bad faith.” A policy of firing any witness that testified negatively during an internal investigation would
certainly constitute bad faith; even an instance of an
allegedly unjustified firing would put the Faragher defense at risk.179

The Sixth Circuit ignored the problem faced by the fired,
cooperating employee, and instead, it relied on a presumed recognition by the employer that, if the employer fired the cooperating worker, then the termination would jeopardize the
employer’s anti-harassment policy—which may subsequently
compromise the employer’s ability to win in a case filed by the
harassed employee. Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit’s logic
here has no relevance to the cooperating employee who, up until
his or her termination, may not have been discriminatorily
harassed, but may only have been providing information re178. The Supreme Court thus recognized in its decision the practical difficulties of a cooperating employee. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852 (2009).
179. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 377 (quoting Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388,
396 (4th Cir. 1999)).
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garding the harassment of another. Rather than protecting the
cooperating employee, the court placed its faith on the employer’s knowledge that it may lose access to the affirmative defense in a lawsuit brought by the specifically sexually harassed
employee, who may never file formal, official, external charges.
The Sixth Circuit’s assumption may not be accurate or adequately protect the cooperating employee. If the affirmative defense, created by the Supreme Court in conjunction with Title
VII, necessitates internal investigations in an effort to prevent
discrimination through anti-discrimination policies, retaliatory
acts premised on those investigations should be considered unlawful, despite the Sixth Circuit’s analysis to the contrary.
2. Respective Obligations under the Affirmative Defense
The Sixth Circuit may have tried to balance the responsibilities of the employer and of the employee, just as the obligations of each were balanced by the Supreme Court in its
analyses in Ellerth,180 Faragher,181 and more recently in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders.182 In Suders, the Court reiterated the use of the affirmative defense and clarified its
exclusive availability for nontangible employment actions taken
by the employer through its supervisors.183 Suders held that
voluntary actions by the employee—for example, through a constructive discharge—are intangible employment actions to
which the affirmative defense applies.184 The Court’s decision
was prompted by recognition of the potential burden on the employer; to have held otherwise would have endangered an employer’s use of the affirmative defense as a shield against
discrimination claims when an employee fails to take advantage
of his or her employer’s anti-discrimination policy.185
180. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998).
181. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998).
182. 542 U.S. 129, 148-50 (2004) (finding that a constructive discharge constituted an intangible employment action, and that an employer may raise the affirmative defense).
183. Id.
184. Id. In situations involving constructive discharge, workers claim that
their employment conditions became unbearable to the point that they were forced
to quit. See, e.g., id. at 141 (“Did working conditions become so intolerable that a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to
resign?”).
185. See id. at 145-51.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/3

30

\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-4\PLR403.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 31

27-OCT-09

DISCRIMINATORY RETALIATION

14:49

719

One way to effect Title VII’s protection against discrimination is to encourage employers to prevent sexual harassment in
the first instance by establishing valid anti-discrimination policies, strengthened by the employers’ knowledge that the policies
provide a significant degree of shelter against claims brought by
employees if the employees ignore them.186 The Suders Court
looked to the analysis supplied in Ellerth and concluded:
The [Ellerth] Court reasoned that tying the liability
standard to an employer’s effort to install effective
grievance procedures would advance Congress’ purpose “to promote conciliation rather than litigation” of
Title VII controversies. At the same time, such
linkage of liability limitation to effective preventive
and corrective measures could serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose by “encourag[ing] employees to report
harassing conduct before it becomes severe or
pervasive.”187

The importance placed by the Supreme Court on providing
conciliation and preventive and corrective measures may indicate that future courts should bolster the protective efforts of an
employer’s internal procedures and offer protection under the
participation clause.
While it is true that the affirmative defense is not completely severable from retaliation, the link is not formed in the
sense that the Sixth Circuit chose to analyze the two concepts.
The affirmative defense concerns whether an employer has a
valid anti-discrimination policy and whether the employee uses
it in the context of an intangible employment action; retaliation
186. As stated in Suders:
Absent . . . an official act, the extent to which the supervisor’s misconduct
has been aided by the agency relation, as we earlier recounted . . . is less
certain. That uncertainty, our precedent establishes, justifies affording the
employer the chance to establish, through the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense, that it should not be held vicariously liable.
542 U.S. at 148-49 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846,
852 (2009) (citing studies put forth within the Petitioner’s Brief, and which the
Petitioner used to argue that “Ellerth and Faragher have prompted many employers to adopt or strengthen procedures for investigating, preventing, and correcting
discriminatory conduct”).
187. Suders, 542 U.S. at 145 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 764 (1998)).
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concerns discriminatory actions taken by the employer irrespective of the affirmative defense.188 The affirmative defense may
be unavailable in cases of retaliation, since the defense’s use is
limited to the sexually harassing environment in which nontangible employment actions are taken against an employee.189
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion confused the requirements needed
to establish a retaliation claim with the principles regarding the
affirmative defense—when each should be read as part of the
universe of sexual harassment law. The two concepts coexist,
separately but not completely apart, and are tethered by a statute and case law with the common goal of preventing discrimination. According to the Sixth Circuit in Crawford, the two
concepts are linked by assumptions that employers may make
in fashioning an effective defense to their actions, rather than
by understanding the concepts as working together to prevent
employment discrimination.
Crawford did not allege that Metro failed to establish an
anti-discrimination policy, nor did the Sixth Circuit claim that
it did.190 Instead, the Sixth Circuit stated that an employer’s
affirmative defense could be jeopardized to the extent that an
employee was, for example, fired, regardless of its anti-harassment policy. In any event, termination, a tangible employment
action, makes raising the policy ineffective, despite the policy’s
existence. Indeed, Crawford’s claim, and her employer’s arguments against culpability, did not specifically involve the employer’s resort to the affirmative defense. Crawford’s argument
188. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63-64 (2006);
Rhonda Reaves, Retaliatory Harassment: Sex and the Hostile Coworker as the Enforcer of Workplace Norms, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 403, 412-417 (2007) (noting that
substantive discrimination protects workers for who they are and retaliation protects workers for what they do).
189. See White, 548 U.S. at 68 (holding that to prove actionable retaliation, “a
plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged
action materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination’” (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). But see
generally Christopher J. Eckhart, Employers Beware: Burlington Northern v.
White and the New Title VII Anti-Retaliation Standard, 41 IND. L. REV. 479 (2008)
(analyzing the use of the affirmative defense in retaliation claims); Steven
Seidenfeld, Employer Liability Under Title VII: Creating an Employer Affirmative
Defense for Retaliation Claims, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1319 (2008) (same).
190. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 F.
App’x 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2006).
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was not that she should be protected under Title VII despite the
anti-discrimination policy, but rather that the court’s analysis
should be consistent with Ellerth and Faragher.191 If an internal investigation results in negative employment consequences
for cooperating employees who confirm discriminatory behavior,
then the internal investigation (whether or not part of an antidiscrimination policy) should not protect an employer when it
retaliates against cooperating employees.192 As discussed in the
following section, the Supreme Court mitigated the difficulties
faced by cooperating employees to the extent that employees
find some protection against retaliation through the opposition
clause.
III.

Crawford in the Supreme Court: Decision and Analysis

The Supreme Court unanimously held in a short, nine-page
opinion that cooperation in an employer’s internal investigation
is protected conduct under Title VII.193 The Court mentioned
the Seventh Circuit’s resolution of McDonnell v. Cisneros, and
stated that, “[b]ecause the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with
those of other Circuits, . . . we granted Crawford’s petition for
certiorari.”194
Like the Sixth Circuit before it, the Supreme Court drew a
distinction between Title VII’s proscriptions against retaliation
191. Crawford cooperated in this case in concert with her employer’s anti-discrimination policy. Id. at 374-75.
192. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 31-39, 2008 WL 1721898, at
*31-39 (discussing the difficulties employees face in providing testimony in support
of their own or a co-worker’s claim). See also George, supra note 76, at 442 n.6
(noting that “studies typically show that between 30 and 60 percent of employees
who report discrimination experience retaliation.” (internal citation omitted));
Ryan, supra note 75, at 746 n.10 (“Studies show that only a small percentage of
women who experience sexual harassment report it. Those who do report it often
fear retaliation by their employer.”).
193. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S.
Ct. 846, 853 (2009). Justices Alito and Thomas concurred in the judgment, but
would have held that opposing conduct should be limited to purposive acts and not
include “silent opposition.” Id. at 853-55 (Alito, J., concurring). They stated that
“the statutory term ‘oppose’ means ‘taking action,’” not merely, for example, expressing an opinion. Id. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 850 (citing Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson
County, Tenn., 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (granting Crawford’s petition for certiorari);
McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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claimed under either the opposition or participation clauses.195
The Court then declined to review Crawford’s claim under the
participation clause because it determined that her claim was
fully addressed by the opposition clause.196 With regard to the
opposition clause, the Court clarified that “[t]he term ‘oppose,’
being left undefined by the statute, carries its ordinary meaning: ‘to resist or antagonize . . . ; to contend against; to confront;
resist; withstand.’ ”197 The Court held that Crawford’s conduct
constituted opposition and that her resulting termination was
retaliation, outlawed by the Act.198 The Court declared that:
There is . . . no reason to doubt that a person can “oppose” by responding to someone else’s question just as
surely as by provoking the discussion, and nothing in
the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination
in the same words when her boss asks a question.199

The Court also noted that its conclusions in reference to the opposition clause were consistent with the arguments presented
by the United States as Amicus Curiae and with the EEOC’s
own guidelines.200
The Supreme Court made clear that the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the opposition clause placed an unwise limit on
195. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 1710 (2d ed. 1988))).
198. Id. at 849-51. The Court noted that “Crawford’s description of the louche
goings-on would certainly qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as ‘resistant’ or
‘antagonistic’ to Hughes’s treatment.” Id. at 851. It then determined that “[t]he
statement Crawford says she gave to Frazier is . . . covered by the opposition
clause, as an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually obnoxious behavior toward her by a fellow employee . . . [which] antagonized her employer to the point of
sacking her on false pretenses.” Id. at 850-51.
199. Id. at 851. See also Transcript of Record, supra note 171, at 27, 2008 WL
4527984, at *27.
[I]f the investigation is conducted on the day a charge is filed at noon, all the
witnesses who came in, in the morning, are unprotected; yet all the witnesses who came in, in the afternoon, would be protected. Yet nobody even
knows that a charge has been filed. And that’s just not something that Congress possibly could have intended and wanted to leave the morning witnesses unprotected from retaliation.
Id.
200. See, e.g., Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851.
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opposing behavior because it required “active, consistent opposing activities to warrant . . . protection against retaliation.”201
According to the Court, the Sixth Circuit failed to realize that,
although “instigat[ing] or initiat[ing]”202 are opposing behaviors
as required by the statute, “they are not limits of it.”203 The
Court further stated:
If it were clear law that an employee who reported discrimination in answering an employer’s questions
could be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees
would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII
offenses against themselves or against others. This is
no imaginary horrible given the documented indications that “[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason
why people stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination.”204

The Court thereby recognized the practical difficulties of cooperating employees who would otherwise be left dangling without protection under the statute. Protection under Title VII
against retaliation must include the cooperating employee, at
least under the opposition clause, if not also, as argued by this
Article, under the participation clause.
The Court chose to analyze Crawford’s arguments concerning the affirmative defense in reference to the opposition
clause.205 The Sixth Circuit had examined the affirmative defense in reference to both the opposition and participation
clauses, and the circuit court discussed its belief that employers
would likely fail to investigate discrimination should Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provisions apply to all employees who cooperate
in internal investigations.206 Focusing on the opposition clause,
201. Id. at 851 (quoting Crawford v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson
County, Tenn., 211 F. App’x 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006)).
202. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376.
203. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851. Prior cases decided by the Supreme Court
similarly state that a list provided by a court in its analysis and application of Title
VII may be nonexhaustive. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 14445 (2004) (noting that which actions are considered tangible employment actions,
and the analyses of actions that are tangible, may extend beyond lists generated in
prior cases).
204. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852 (quoting Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90
MINN. L. REV. 18, 20 (2005)).
205. Id. at 850-51.
206. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376-77.
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the Supreme Court stated: “As [the Sixth Circuit and the employer] see it, if retaliation is an easy charge when things go bad
for an employee who responded to enquiries, employers will
avoid the headache by refusing to raise questions about possible
discrimination.”207 Pursuant to the Court’s prior decisions,
however, the affirmative defense requires that employers promulgate and enforce valid anti-discrimination policies.208 Binding its explanation of the incentives created for employers by
virtue of the affirmative defense with the goals served by Title
VII, the Court in Crawford stated:
Employers are thus subject to a strong inducement to
ferret out and put a stop to any discriminatory activity
in their operations as a way to break the circuit of imputed liability. The possibility that an employer might
someday want to fire someone who might charge discrimination traceable to an internal investigation does
not strike us as likely to diminish the attraction of an
Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense.209

The Court’s discussion of the affirmative defense may imply that an employee’s cooperating actions, particularly when
taken in concert with his or her employer’s anti-discrimination
policy (as was the case in Crawford), will be protected as opposing and participating conduct. The employer who takes negative action against the worker should be liable if the employer
responds by retaliating against the worker’s cooperation; a decision that the worker under such circumstances is not fully protected would flummox the incentives established by the
affirmative defense. As noted previously, the Court in Suders
pointed out, in its discussion of the affirmative defense, that “tying the liability standard to an employer’s effort to install effective grievance procedures would advance Congress’ purpose ‘to
promote conciliation rather than litigation’ of Title VII
controversies.”210

207. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852.
208. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998).
209. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852 (internal citations omitted).
210. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 145 (2004) (quoting Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 764).
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For the defense to be successful, an employer must understand that investigations of alleged discrimination are required.
The validity of the affirmative defense requires, in part, an investigation.211 The incentive to investigate establishes that actions that occur in connection with an employer’s application of
an anti-harassment policy (including investigations of discrimination as the policies are applied) are official acts, as required
by the Court by its establishment of the affirmative defense,
and necessary if future courts insist that participation-clause
protection must come in tandem with official acts.
IV. Is a Lawsuit a Worker’s First and Best Resort for an
Employer’s Alleged Discriminatory Wrong?
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination.212 Title VII
also specifically provides that discriminatory employment retaliation is unlawful.213 While the Act provides a mechanism for
bringing suit against a discriminatory employer, the purpose of
Title VII goes beyond the creation of a cause of action. Title VII
discourages lawsuits, not only by virtue of the employer’s fear of
being sued, but also by its statutory requirements as applied by
the courts. “Although Title VII seeks ‘to make persons whole
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination,’ its ‘primary objective,’ like that of any statute
meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress but
to avoid harm.”214 Depending on their interpretation of Title
211. The Court addressed the employer’s argument in its interpretation of the
affirmative defense (that workers are responsible for actively reporting discrimination, in an effort to mitigate potential harms, and that Crawford did not do so in
response to her co-workers’ discrimination). See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852. In
disagreeing with the employer’s view, the Court stated:
We have never suggested that employees have a legal obligation to report
discrimination against others to their employer on their own initiative, let
alone lose statutory protection by failing to speak. . . . [E]mployees will often
face retaliation not for opposing discrimination they themselves face, but for
reporting discrimination suffered by others. Thus, they are not “victims” of
anything until they are retaliated against, and it would be absurd to require
them to “mitigate” damages they may be unaware they will suffer.
Id. at 853 n.3.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
213. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
214. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)) (emphasis added). See generally Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s
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VII, courts may promote litigation, however, rather than prevent harm.
The following section analyzes the resulting peril that
would ensue if the Supreme Court had agreed with the Sixth
Circuit’s interpretation and neglected to afford the Crawford
worker any protection under Title VII. The identified danger is
lessened to the extent the Court permitted Crawford to successfully make a claim under the opposition clause. Nevertheless,
consideration of Title VII’s purpose, as a device to allow or disallow claims and as a method of preventing discrimination, may
be goals that the Court kept in mind in its resolution of Crawford.215 This section examines the premium placed on the litigious resolution of discrimination, particularly through the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Crawford.
A. Crawford and Ledbetter: Context to the Controversies
Both Crawford and Ledbetter involved Title VII lawsuits;
Crawford addressed retaliation,216 while the Ledbetter employee
claimed discriminatory pay.217 In Crawford, the Sixth Circuit
ruled that merely internal investigations will not trigger antiretaliation protection under Title VII,218 but the Supreme Court
reversed.219 In Ledbetter, the employee’s failure to register an
official action early in the process defeated a later Title VII
claim.220 The Sixth Circuit’s resolution of Crawford and the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter both emphasized the need
to take official action in order for the employee to make a later
complaint that courts may contemplate, and both of these decisions placed the onus of making an official allegation on the
Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469 (2007) (noting that in addition
to establishing liability, Title VII retaliation protection also encourages workplace
communication).
215. See, e.g., Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851 (stating that “nothing in the statute
requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her
own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the same words
when her boss asks a question”).
216. Id. at 849.
217. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621-22 (2007).
218. Crawford v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 F.
App’x 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2006).
219. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850-51.
220. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 642-43.
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plaintiff.221 The obligation to initiate a complaint is not contrary to the Act; one cannot win a suit if one does not file. The
practical circumstances of the Crawford and Ledbetter employees meant, however, that Title VII’s protections were circumscribed to the extent the courts’ rulings were left undisturbed—
either through a successful appeal to the Supreme Court for the
employee in Crawford or through Congressional action in response to Ledbetter.
B. The Implications of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., Inc.
In Ledbetter, the Supreme Court held that an employee
who alleges discriminatory pay must file a Title VII claim
within 180 days of his or her employer’s initial discriminatory
pay practice.222 Title VII’s statutory time limit on discriminatory actions required, in the Court’s understanding, that the
permissible time period during which the employee may sue be
triggered by the first incident of discrimination.223 For similarly situated employees, this meant that the employee must
sue at the moment the employee is paid less for discriminatory
reasons.224
The time limitation placed on filing suit for discriminatory
pay and the concomitant necessity of filing at the first moment
that discriminatory pay is suspected place employees in a problematic situation. First, employees may not know that they are
being paid less than co-workers until long after the discriminatory pay begins. The practical difficulties of discovering a pay
differential, or indeed of knowing how any employees are paid,
was discussed by Justice Ginsburg in her Ledbetter dissent.225
Justice Ginsberg stated that “[i]t is not unusual . . . for management to decline to publish employee pay levels, or for employees
to keep private their own salaries.”226 The employee who does
221. See Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 376-77; Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 632.
222. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 623-24.
223. Id. at 639.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 643-61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 649-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also noted that
“one-third of private sector employers have adopted specific rules prohibiting employees from discussing their wages with co-workers; only one in ten employers
has adopted a pay openness policy.” Id. at 650 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
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not know that he or she is being paid less for potentially discriminatory reasons until after the statutory time limit has
passed would not meet the 180-day deadline, and the Ledbetter
majority failed to offer relief in such cases. The second reason
why the 180-day filing limitation is problematic is that if the
worker learns of a discriminatory pay differential in time to
meet the deadline (or at least suspects discrimination may have
occurred), then the Ledbetter decision placed a premium on suing early, to avoid losing access to a cause of action under Title
VII. The moment that employees understood or suspected that
they were being paid less, they must file, or again, they would
lose access to civil relief if more than 180 days passed after the
pay discrepancy was initiated.227
The Court’s decision left the employee with the following
dilemma. First, the employee might hope that the pay differential was not based on discriminatory animus, but simply acknowledge that discrimination could be at work, and accept the
pay differential and not sue—even if the employee eventually
learned that pay was awarded discriminatorily. Second, alternatively, the employee might file suit under Title VII, knowing
that a failure to file would result in foreclosure of a suit if the
time limitation was violated, regardless of what the employee
hoped, believed or eventually learned. The latter case would indicate that the employee would make an early, presumptive
strike against the employer’s pay policies, which may not, understating the case here, broadly signify to the employer the
good will of the worker. In any event, the employee may not
know whether a sufficiently material differential in pay would
be found, which could be the case, for instance, if a small difference in pay were allowed to compound over years of employment.228 Unfortunately, the employee might merely suspect
Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”:
Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168
(2004)).
227. See generally Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of
Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008) (discussing Ledbetter in the Supreme Court); Young Eun Lee, Creating a Proper Incentive Structure: A Case Study of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 15 CARDOZO J. L. &
GENDER 117 (2008) (explaining the impact of Ledbetter, including the incentives to
prevent discrimination).
228. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68
(2006) (requiring the retaliatory harm to be materially adverse); Ledbetter v.
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that discrimination motivated the differential. If employees
merely suspect unlawful conduct, is that suspicion enough to
warrant action under Title VII? While Title VII was not intended to promote speculative lawsuits,229 and, therefore, one
should know about discriminatory intent before filing, the
Court’s decision nonetheless could prompt the employee to file
early, or else forever relinquish any right to sue even if the employee subsequently discovered additional information regarding discrimination and its material impact. Under either
alternative, employees were left either unprotected or more
likely to file suit. Congress voted to change the Ledbetter result
through the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, recognizing
that harm resulting from discriminatory pay occurs every time
the employee receives a discriminatory paycheck. Under the
Act, Title VII’s 180-day limitation for filing suit is, thereby, renewed with each check.230 President Barack Obama chose to
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating “[A]t
the end of 1997, [Ledbetter] was still earning $3727 per month, less than all fifteen
of the other Area Managers in Tire Assembly. The lowest paid male Area Manager
was making $4286, roughly 15% more than Ledbetter; the highest paid was making $5236, roughly 40% more than Ledbetter.”).
229. See, e.g., White, 548 U.S. at 68. The Court noted the concept of the materiality of harm:
We speak of material adversity because we believe it is important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does not set
forth a general civility code for the American workplace. An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee
from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work
and that all employees experience. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to
prevent employer interference with unfettered access to Title VII’s remedial
mechanisms. It does so by prohibiting employer actions that are likely to
deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, the courts,
and their employers. And normally petty slights, minor annoyances, and
simple lack of good manners will not create such deterrence.
White, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
230. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(2009). Congress stated that:
(1) The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550
U.S. 618 (2007), significantly impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that Congress established and that have been bedrock principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter decision
undermines those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the
intent of Congress.
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make the Act the first bill that he signed into law, which he did
on January 29, 2009.231
If Ledbetter stood for the proposition that employees should
file actions early in order to preserve their claim for discriminatory pay (if they could file at all), then the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Crawford similarly encouraged employees to seek
official, external actions for discrimination claims, despite an
(2) The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of discriminatory compensation claims ignores the reality of wage discrimination and is at odds
with the robust application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended.
(3) With regard to any charge of discrimination under any law, nothing in
this Act is intended to preclude or limit an aggrieved person’s right to introduce evidence of an unlawful employment practice that has occurred outside
the time for filing a charge of discrimination.
Id. § 2, 123 Stat. at 5.
231. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 amended Title VII
by adding:
(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs,
with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this title,
when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted,
when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time
wages, benefits or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part
from such a decision or other practice.
(B) In addition to any relief authorized by section 1977A of the Revised
Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981a), liability may accrue and an aggrieved person
may obtain relief as provided in subsection (g)(1), including recovery of back
pay for up to two years preceding the filing of the charge, where the unlawful
employment practices that have occurred during the charge filing period are
similar or related to unlawful employment practices with regard to discrimination in compensation that occurred outside the time for filing a charge.
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 3, 123 Stat. at 5-6 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
(2006)) (emphasis added). The Act also amends, for example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4, 123 Stat. 6 (amending 29 U.S.C. 626(d)
(2006)), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 5, 123 Stat. 6 (amending scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12203 (2006)). To some extent, the
Act reinstates the “continuing violation doctrine” for pay discrimination cases.
See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002). The
Court in Morgan explained that, in regard to a Title VII case concerning allegations of race discrimination, “each week’s paycheck that delivered less to a black
than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII.” Id. at
112 (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986) (per curiam)). The Act
also limits the recovery for harms caused to a maximum of two years. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 2, 123 Stat. 6 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). See also
Lee, supra note 227, at 129-31 (discussing the last major amendments to Title VII
in 1991).
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employer’s efforts to address the alleged discrimination
internally.
C. The Implications of Crawford
The Sixth Circuit held in Crawford that an employee who
cooperated in an employer’s internal investigation of discrimination may not establish a claim of unlawful retaliation, even if
the employee was fired due to his or her participation.232 The
Sixth Circuit’s Crawford decision failed to protect employees
who internally provide information related to discrimination
claims in favor of protecting only those employees whose cooperation in an investigation occurred in association with an official,
external action. The result in the Sixth Circuit was, as was true
in Ledbetter: officially file, and file soon, or risk losing access to
the courts.
The Supreme Court recognized the inadequacy of the protection provided by the Sixth Circuit’s decision. The Court
noted that employees in circumstances similar to those in
Crawford are protected by the EEOC under the opposition
clause, according to the EEOC’s guidelines regarding
retaliation.233
The EEOC Compliance Manual states that actions taken
against workers by an employer may constitute retaliation, and
the manual does not contain a specific reference to any need for
232. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 F.
App’x 373, 376-77 (6th Cir. 2006).
233. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S.
Ct. 846, 851 (2009). The Court stated that “‘[w]hen an employee communicates to
her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of employment
discrimination, that communication’ virtually always ‘constitutes the employee’s
opposition to the activity.’” Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Crawford, 129 S. Ct. 846 (No. 06-1595), 2008 WL
1757590, at *9) (emphasis in original). Additionally, the EEOC Guidelines stated
that opposition includes “informing an individual’s prospective employer about the
individual’s protected activity.” 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 614:1, at § 8II(D)(2) (May 20, 1998) (emphasis added). So long as the opposition is based on “a
reasonable and good-faith belief that the opposed practices were unlawful,” a violation of retaliation charge can be substantiated. Id. § 8-II(B)(3)(b). Examples of
protected opposition include “[t]hreatening to file a charge or other formal complaint alleging discrimination,” “[c]omplaining to anyone about alleged discrimination against oneself or others,” and “[r]efusing to obey an order because of a
reasonable belief that it is discriminatory.” Id. § 8-II(B)(2) (emphasis added).

43

\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-4\PLR403.txt

732

unknown

Seq: 44

PACE LAW REVIEW

27-OCT-09

14:49

[Vol. 29:689

employees to previously register a formal EEOC charge.234 This
is made clear in the EEOC Compliance Manual’s discussion of
the opposition clause of the anti-retaliation provisions of Title
VII and the EEOC’s general guidance on retaliation:
The anti-retaliation provisions make it unlawful
to discriminate against an individual because s/he has
opposed any practice made unlawful under the employment discrimination statutes. This protection applies if an individual explicitly or implicitly
communicates to his or her employer or other covered
entity a belief that its activity constitutes a form of employment discrimination that is covered by any of the
statutes enforced by the EEOC.235

The Compliance Manual also provides examples of opposition:
A complaint or protest about alleged employment
discrimination to a manager, union official, co-worker,
company EEO official, attorney, newspaper reporter,
Congressperson, or anyone else constitutes opposition.
Opposition may be nonverbal, such as picketing or engaging in a production slow-down. Furthermore, a
complaint on behalf of another, or by an employee’s
representative, rather than by the employee herself,
constitutes protected opposition by both the person who
makes the complaint and the person on behalf of whom
the complaint is made.236

The Compliance Manual further states that, with respect to
the participation clause, no official government action must
first be taken in order to qualify for protection against retaliation.237 The Manual states:
The anti-retaliation provisions make it unlawful
to discriminate against any individual because s/he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or litigation under Title VII, the ADEA, the EPA,
or the ADA. This protection applies to individuals
234.
235.
236.
237.

See 2 EEOC Compl. Man., § 614:1, at § 8-II.
Id. § 8-II(B)(1) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. § 8-II(B)(2) (emphasis added).
See id. § 8-II(C)(1).
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challenging employment discrimination under the
statutes enforced by EEOC in EEOC proceedings, in
state administrative or court proceedings, as well as in
federal court proceedings, and to individuals who testify or otherwise participate in such proceedings.238

With respect to the guidance provided by the EEOC in regard to participating conduct, the Compliance Manual notes
that participating is a protected act and that participating may
include conduct in conjunction with an EEOC action, but that
the connection is not mandatory.239
Participation means taking part in an employment
discrimination proceeding. Participation is protected
activity even if the proceeding involved claims that ultimately were found to be invalid. Examples of participation include: [f]iling a charge of employment
discrimination; [c]ooperating with an internal investigation of alleged discriminatory practices; or [s]erving
as a witness in an EEO investigation or litigation.240

The Supreme Court has acknowledged the influence that
an agency’s interpretation can have on a court’s interpretation
of statutes. In Federal Express Corporation v. Holowecki, the
Court examined how the EEOC administered claims filed under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967:241
Just as we defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretations of the statute when it issues regulations in the
first instance, the agency is entitled to further deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations it has put in force. Under [Auer v. Robbins],
we accept the agency’s position unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”242

The Court in Crawford cited to Holowecki and emphasized
the importance of the EEOC’s interpretations of the Court’s de238. Id. (emphasis added).
239. See id. § 8-II(C)(2).
240. EEOC, Retaliation, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/retaliation.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
241. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-629 (2006).
242. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1155 (2008) (quoting
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)) (internal citations omitted).
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cisions.243 Future courts may agree with the EEOC’s insistence
that Crawford successfully made claims under both the opposition and the participation clauses, holding that the EEOC’s understanding of retaliation under Title VII is entitled to similar
deference.244
If the Sixth Circuit’s approach to Crawford had been
echoed by the Supreme Court, a premium would have been
placed on filing lawsuits, rather than on fostering employment
that both discourages discrimination through internal investigations of unlawful activity and protects workers who cooperate
in those investigations. The Ledbetter decision also increased
the likelihood of lawsuits with respect to claims that may ultimately be premature, but which are filed in order to preserve a
worker’s future actions against an employer. Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit’s resolution of Crawford held that the employee
who failed to sue faced the possibility that he or she might be
subject to unprotected retaliatory actions, including dismissal,
and that the retaliation would only be actionable if formal
charges had been previously filed.245
The employees in Crawford and Ledbetter eventually did
file suit, but were unsuccessful. In Crawford, the employee’s
official action against the employer came only after she suffered
retaliation.246 In Ledbetter, the employee’s official action came
too late to comport with Title VII’s time limitations.247 Accord243. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S.
Ct. 846, 851 (2009) (noting that “the EEOC compliance manuals ‘reflect a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance’” (quoting Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. at 1156)).
244. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 233, at 9-25, 2008 WL 1757590, at *9-25 (arguing the EEOC’s position
regarding coverage by the opposition and participation clauses). See generally
Joan M. Savage, Note, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse
Employment Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII Retaliation, 46 B.C.
L. REV. 215 (2004) (discussing discrimination, retaliation, and providing protection
to the employee, as consistent with EEOC guidelines).
245. If the employee personally suffers no discrimination, then he or she may
be unlikely to file.
246. Crawford could have filed her own discrimination claim for sexual harassment based upon her testimony as to what she told Ms. Frazier during the
Metro internal investigation. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson
County, Tenn., 211 F. App’x 373, 375 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006). See infra note 171 (discussing the alleged harassment suffered by Crawford and why she did not file her
own claim).
247. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 632 (2007).
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ing to the Courts’ respective understandings, both employees
had an obligation to file, and, in both cases, filing an official
action early in the process was mandatory for protection to be
available.
In reference to the need to register a prior, official charge,
the employer in Crawford expressed its concern that protecting
workers who cooperate in an employer’s internal investigation
would create a cause of action that was not intended under Title
VII.248 The Sixth Circuit agreed, noting:
The impact of Title VII on an employer can be onerous.
By protecting only participation in investigations that
occur relative to EEOC proceedings, the participation
clause prevents the burden of Title VII from falling on
an employer who proactively chooses to launch an internal investigation. Expanding the purview of the
participation clause to cover such investigations would
simultaneously discourage them.249

The Sixth Circuit thus established a premium for filing suit
that appeared contradictory to its stated intention of protecting
employers from “the burden of Title VII.”250 On the one hand,
the Sixth Circuit assumed that employers must know that valid
anti-discrimination policies are required of prudent, diligent
employers, and that valid policies should provide for investigation. On the other hand, the court assumed that placing investigations within the types of official acts that trip retaliation
protection (should negative consequences ensue for the testifying workers) would discourage investigations. The Sixth Circuit wanted it both ways, but neither assumption could have
been helpful for a worker in Crawford’s position.
248. Transcript of Record, supra note 171, at 27-28, 2008 WL 4527984, at *2728.
Title VII was the result of a congressional compromise which struck a balance between protecting the interests of employees and employers. In relation to the anti-retaliation provisions of [Title 42, United States Code,
Section 2000e-3(a)], that balance was struck to protect the rights of employees to report allegedly discriminatory activity, as well as employers’ rights
to manage their workplaces.
Id.
249. Crawford, 211 F. App’x at 377.
250. Id.
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As stated by the Supreme Court, “Title VII depends for its
enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who are willing
to file complaints and act as witnesses.”251 Cooperation is facilitated to the extent that the opposition clause covers employees
like Crawford,252 but cooperation will be further encouraged if it
is also covered through the participation clause. To ensure employees’ cooperation, to protect all employees under the Act, and
to encourage employers to prevent discrimination through their
anti-discrimination policies, future courts must carefully consider whether employment discrimination is best prevented by
the litigious employee or by an employee who is encouraged to
informally cooperate with his or her employer.
V. Conclusion
In order to fulfill the purposes of Title VII, the Sixth Circuit
required that employees file an official claim, or else they would
not be protected by the Act. If one recognizes that cooperation
in an internal investigation qualifies as an act that constitutes
opposing conduct under the opposition clause, or more particularly, as participation under the participation clause, then one
may indeed be classifying that cooperation as an official act.
The Sixth Circuit would allow as official acts only those which
take the form of external complaints; an external, official claim
would be the sole type of official action that the Sixth Circuit
would continence under the participation clause. Lawsuits are
not, however, the only types of official actions contemplated by
the Act, as the Court recognized in Ellerth and Faragher.253
Other acts, particularly those whose intents and purposes are to
further the goals of Title VII, must be recognized as triggering
the protection of Title VII—not only through the opposition
clause, but through the participation clause as well. The Supreme Court explained in White that Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provisions are intended to “maintain[ ] unfettered access to
statutory remedial mechanisms.”254 The Supreme Court had
251. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).
252. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S.
Ct. 846, 850-51 (2009).
253. See, e.g., supra notes 8, 231.
254. White, 548 U.S. at 64 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration
omitted).
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the opportunity to acknowledge that cooperation in an investigation is both an act of opposition and of participation against
discrimination. The easier path for the Court was to recognize
cooperation in internal investigations only as an act of opposition, not participation. The better path would recognize it as
both.
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